proach, this paper seeks to use an alternative ap-
clusions. In the interest of brevity, features of the tobacco) and livestock. Further disaggregation of tobacco program and characteristics of tobacco prothe model by subregions may not significantly gram and characteristics of tobacco production are reduce the errors as tobacco production is connot discussed separately but are included where centrated i a few counties in the coastal belt of necessary in developing the empirical models.
South Carolna.
THE MODEL TO EVALUATE IMPACTS ON The 1984 Tobacco Program Provisions TOBACCO FARMS
Since the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, acreage allotments or quotas have been used to Model Stratification restrict tobacco production in order to raise prices Regional responses to policy changes are often (at/or) above the support rate. The national quota is estimated as the aggregate of the resource and/or assigned to individual farms according to production product adjustments on individual representative history. Through 1982, allotments and quotas could farms (Jordan) . Since research resources are not not be sold separate from the farmland but could be available to determine the output of every farm, a leased and transferred from one farm to another similar methodology is utilized in this study. 3 Howwithin the same county. Since 1982, owners of flueever, to minimize aggregation errors, the study area cured allotments and quotas are permitted to sell is disaggregated into relatively homogeneous units these rights separately from the farms to which the by explicitly defining representative farms on the allotments are attached to other farms in the same basis of inherent differential factor endowments county. Lease and transfer of flue-cured quota has (Miller) .
been abolished since 1987. Representative farms are delineated using two Because information on quota ownership of inlevels of stratification: tobacco acreage size-groups dividual farms is not available, each representative and harvest-curing technology (Table 1) . Tobacco farm is allocated the quota necessary to produce its acreage and harvest-curing technology are among market share of production in 1984, i.e., in the the important factors explaining differences in the benchmark model. To reflect 1984 conditions, indecision-making process of tobacco farms. 4 In adcome from the lease and transfer of tobacco quota is dition, farms in the seven representative groups apincluded in the benchmark model. pear to be relatively homogeneous with respect to:
To estimate annual economic surplus created in (1) percentage of land under different enterprises; South Carolina from deregulating tobacco producand (2) other characteristics, such as formal education, a single-period linear programming model is tional levels and off-farm employment of producers.
used. To treat the phenomenon of capital accumulaHowever, some aggregation errors may still persist tion more realistically, e.g., quota buying and sellbecause of differences in risk aversion attitudes, ing, a dynamic model is required. However, in the learning behavior on the part of farmers, external static model, it is also possible to conceive the lease and internal credit rationing, and on-farm resources rate as the first annual payment for quota bought in available for the production of crops (other than 1984.
The most direct consequence of deregulation is Pomareda). Risk cost is estimated as the product of that tobacco supply rights would become worthless.
variable cost and the associated coefficient of variaLease income in the benchmark model serves as an tion in yield (Adams et al.; Epperson et al.) . 7 For estimate of the annual loss to quota owners in the farmers participating in government programs, risk deregulated market scenarios. The sales price of cost is estimated as the product of variable cost and quota converted to an annual basis could have been the associated coefficient of variation in Agricultural used to account for the loss to quota owners. The Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS) results would have been similar.
yield. 8 The model solutions correspond to industry equilibrium under perfect competition in the sense Decision-Making in a Multi-Product Firm that price is equal to marginal cost (marginal risk A tobacco farmer will lease out quota only when cost plus marginal resource cost) for each activity the combination of income from the lease and in- (Hazell and Scandizzo) . come earned by reallocating the tobacco inputs to Expected net returns to land and labor (family and other alternatives exceed income from producing hired) are equal to expected gross returns minus tobacco. Therefore, to permit each representative average "activity" costs. Average "activity" costs farm to select its optimal enterprise combinations are defined as the sum of average risk costs and independently, a polystructural linear programming average resources costs. Average resource costs exmodel is used.
elude costs of hired labor because labor hiring acThe producer is assumed to make decisions which tivities are specified separately. maximize expected net returns (to land, tobacco Matl Mathematical Model quota, and unpaid family labor) subject to restrictions on enterprise levels and resource supply. To
The following notation is used in formulating the simulate as closely as possible the actual cropping mathematical model: patterns on tobacco farms in 1984, futures prices and Yij = quality of the i-th activity on the j-th farm, risk costs are used to estimate expected net returns. i = 1, ..., 9 (tobacco, corn, wheat, soybeans, If there is no interaction between price and quanwheat-soybean rotation, cow-calf, slaughter tity risk, Holthausen shows that the optimal output cattle, feeder pigs, and hogs); j = 1, ..., 7. 9 chosen by a competitive, net revenue maximizing Yfjt = hours of off-farm employment by the j-th firm is such that marginal cost is equal to the forward farm in the t-th time period. price and is independent of the firm's degree of risk Yqlj = pounds of tobacco quota leased out by the aversion and the probability distribution of the variaj-th farm. tion in price. 6 Therefore, futures prices are used to X^~~~ • u Yq2j= pounds of tobacco quota leased in by the represent expected prices at the time resources are -th fa committed to production (Gardner; McSweeny et jh al.) . Since no futures markets for tobacco or feeder Ywjt= hours of labor hired by the j-th farm in t-th pigs exist, season-average prices during 1984 are time period t= , ,3 (January to June, used as proxies for expected prices. Expected gross July to September, and October to returns are estimated from expected prices and December). season-average yields in South Carolina in 1984. Pij = expected net returns to land and labor (and To represent additional compensation required by quota) for the i-th activity produced by the farmers for producing crops with large variations in j-th farm. yield, "risk" costs are included (Simmons and Pfj = off-farm wage rate for the j-th farm.
6 To avoid complications due to interaction between price and quantity risk and its effects on production, prices of all products, except tobacco, are assumed not to be affected by output of individual producers in South Carolina. For many farm products, prices are determined in national or international markets-and the output of individual producers is uncorrelated with price because each producer is a price taker.
7 When risk costs are included, benchmark solutions correspond more closely to actual 1984 estimates. The changes in crop mix (greater acreage under soybeans and less under corn when risk costs are included) result from lower variance of soybean yields as compared to that of corn. Similar results were obtained by Kramer, et al. 8 ASCS yield is for Horry County, SC, for the years 1979 through 1983 (South Carolina Crop and Livestock Reporting Service). 9 Units are acres for crops and number of head for livestock. Pq = lease rate of $.045 per pound for tobacco (4) Aqi Yi +Yqj < B qij. quota. Pw = wage rate for hired labor employed.
(5) Ahij Yij < Bhij. Alij = amount of land required by a unit of i-th activity on the j-th farm.
(6) Yjt < Bj.
Afijt= amount of family labor required by a unit of t= 1 i-th activity on the j-th farm in the t-th time
Aqij= amount of quota required for a unit of j=1 j = tobacco production on the j-th farm. the i-th activity on the j-th farm. 10 Bfj = hours of off-farm employment permitted for the j-th farm. Constraints can be interpreted as follows: constraints (2)-(6) require that land, family labor, base B = hours of farm labor available in the region.
acres or tobacco quota, institutional (if any), and Ij = expected net returns to land, unpaid labor off-farm employment limits on the j-th farm not be and management by the j-th farm, before exceeded; (7) requires that, for all tobacco farms, the inclusion of lease and transfer total tobacco quota leased out equal total tobacco provisions of the tobacco program. quota leased in; (8) requires that hired-labor limits The objective function is of the form: 11 for the region not be exceeded; (9) permits the j-th subject to represent farm constraints on land, family labor, m off-farm employment, tobacco harvest-curing (2) dE Alij Yij < Blj . equipment, base acres and tobacco quota are obi=1 tained from a 1984 survey of tobacco quota market +m Y~~~t • ~participants (Dangerfield) . Information on (a) fu- During this study, the input-output model could be a production scenario hypothesized to be a realistic updated using detailed producer price indices only representation of deregulating tobacco production. through 1982. Therefore, the linear programming Prices of all products, except tobacco, are assumed model solutions (gross value of output of crops and unaffected by deregulation. For tobacco, prices are livestock) in 1984 prices are converted to 1982 at best only partly determined by market conditions prices using producer price indices. The underlying within the region. Thus, to estimate the impacts of assumption is that the 1982 technical coefficient deregulation on tobacco output and prices, estimates matrix is the best available representation of interinof reduction in costs of production and national price dustrial relationships in 1984. The effects of using elasticities of demand and supply are used. different base periods for the linear programming Sumner and Alston suggest that deregulation of model and the input-output model would be relativetobacco production would reduce costs of current ly unimportant for overall impacts on the economy U.S. tobacco output by 30 percent due to elimination although potentially some individual sectoral imof quota lease rates (annual quota income to the pacts can be badly forecast (Miller and Blair) . The owners), movement of the tobacco industry to the qualifier "potentially" is necessary because forecastregions where production costs are lowest, and coning errors can be reduced by improving the quality solidation of marginal production units. 
Goodwin et al.). An intermediate-run supply elas-
To incorporate the impacts of deregulation on ticity of 1.8 and a long-run supply elasticity of 5 and tobacco prices, it is necessary to relax the assumpa share-weighted (domestic and export) demand tion of constancy in relative prices in basic inputelasticity of -2 is used in this analysis (Sumner and output analysis. The approach followed in this Alston). Given the reduction in costs of production analysis to incorporate exogenous changes in tobacand the price elasticities of supply and demand, the co prices is adopted from an input-output methodolestimated change in quantity (price) in the interogy provided by Lee et al. mediate run is about 34 (-17) percent and in the long run is 47 (-23) percent.
Intermediate run is defined as the time period in Mathematical Model which the scale of operation cannot be changed, i.e., expansion of tobacco acreage is limited by the exist-
The following notation is used in formulating the ing capacity of harvest-curing technology. The long input-output model: run is defined as the time period in which all factors I = (n x n) identity matrix; n = 62. of production are variable. A = (n x n) matrix of technical coefficients in THE MODEL TO EVALUATE IMPACTS ON 1982 prices. THE ECONOMY A' = (n x n) matrix of technical coefficients, A 62-sector closed input-output model of the adjusted for changes in tobacco prices South Carolina economy is used to estimate the associated with deregulation. impacts of adjustments on tobacco farms on total A62n' (n x n) diagonal matrix, with value (direct, indirect, and induced) earned income. 12 added coefficients of A' in the principal Ideally, the linear programming model and the South diagonal. (1982) Benchmark Application price, and P1 is any other price of the n-th A benchmark application is used to identify and commodity if P # P1S and zero otherwise. 14 resolve any numerical and/or conceptual errors by Df = (n x n) diagonal matrix with changes in final comparing programmed solutions with observed demand down the principal diagonal. 1984 production patterns. It also serves as a vantage H6u,= (1 x n) vector of value added coefficients point for evaluating the solutions for simulated con-
_,,~ (n co l dCollectively for all farms in the benchmark model H62U-(1 x n) vector of value added (xn)vectr of value addd solution, land used for tobacco and wheatproduction coefficients of (I -A).
are the same as in the 1984 estimates (Table 2 ). T2,n = (1 x n) vector of the elements in the However, land allocated in the benchmark model for tobacco row of (I -A).
corn is 7 percent higher and in soybeans is 1 percent T2,n = (1 x n) vector of the elements in the lower than in the 1984 estimates. Livestock productobacco row of (I -A).
tion is higher for the benchmark model. Deviations Ef = (n x 1) vector of change in value added in of benchmark solution values from 1984 estimates the n-th sector due to changes in the final are small. demand of all sectors.
Realized gross and net revenue (gross and net Emn = (I x n) vector of change in value added in revenue, hereafter) are used to evaluate the financial the economy due to a change in the final impacts of deregulation on tobacco farms. Gross demand of the n-th sector. revenue is estimated from season-average prices and demand of the n-th sector.
yields in South Carolina in 1984. Net revenue is s = (n x 1) vector of ones.
defined as gross revenue minus average total 1 = (1 x n) vector of ones.
resource cost (excluding land and family labor).
Equations given by Lee et al. as adapted for this
Gross and net revenue for all tobacco farmers, esstudy to estimate the impacts of deregulation on total timated from activity levels in the benchmark model, value added in the economy of South Carolina can are $264 million and $91 million respectively. be expressed as follows:
Intermediate Run X 21 2 produce more tobacco (Table 3) . Given the (14) EAfi = A62,n x (I -A')-1 x DA x 1. resource constraints and lower tobacco prices, Farm X 212 minimizes losses by reducing tobacco producEquations can be interpreted as follows: equation tion and diverting resources to other enterprises. On (11) specifies the reduction in costs to sectors that all other farms, tobacco production expands at the use tobacco as a production input; (12) specifies the expense of other products, primarily corn among the increase in the value added coefficient in the sectors crops and feeder-pigs and beef-cows among livethat use tobacco as a production input; (13) specifies stock activities. the change in total value added in the n-th sector due Average costs of tobacco production (excluding to the changes in final demand associated with lease rates) decrease from $1.08 to $1.04 per pound. deregulation in all sectors; and (14) specifies the This is because of consolidation on farms with change in total value added in the economy due to a mechanical harvesters and economies of scale in change in the final demand of the n-th sector. The tobacco production. However, the increase in tobaccolumn sum of (n x 1) vector E^f is equal to the row co output raises total costs of production by $33 sum of (1 x n) vector Efn, i.e., net annual change in million. As gross revenue from tobacco increases only by $22 million (due to the reduction in price in net revenue from other enterprises, reduces total and elimination of quota lease income), net revenue net revenue by $13 million. decreases by $11 million 15 (Table 4 ). The change n At a disaggregated level, deregulation reduces (innet revenue from tobacco, coupled with the decrease creases) total net (gross) revenue for all farms, ex- general equilibrium demand curve (in a Leontief aGross and net revenue in the benchmark model solusense), and between the two supply curves for all tion for all tobacco farms in South Carolina is $263.9 milsectors in the economy. lion and $91.4 million, respectively.
Gainers and losers in deregulation are determined bGross and net revenue in the intermediate run for all tobacco farms in South Carolina is $281.8 million and by examining the changes total valued added on $78.4 million, respectively.
an industry-by-industry basis ( Table 5) . If tobacco CGross and net revenue in the long run for all tobacco production is deregulated, increases in total value farms in South Carolina is $284.7 million and $71.3 miladded accruing to farm product sectors will equal lion, respectively. $1.4 million in the intermediate run and $1.6 million in the long run. However, gains in these sectors are smaller than gains in the non-farm sectors. Although total value added increases in all non-farm sectors, the biggest gainers are concentrated in the industries cept Farm X222 (Farm X 2 1 2 ). Farm X222, with excess that supply inputs, directly or indirectly, to agriculcapacity of mechanical harvesters, is able to expand ture, i.e., construction, chemical products, rubber tobacco acreage and achieve economies of scale.
products, metal products, machinery, motor freight, wholesale and retail trade, communications, and finance and insurance.
Long Run

IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT CHANGES IN Approximately 156.2 million pounds of tobacco
IMP TOBACCO PROGRAM are marketed at a price of $1.39 per pound. Farms Xlii, X 112 , and X 212 , do not produce tobacco, and
The Tobacco Improvement Act of 1984 (P.L. 72, resources freed are used primarily for corn producSubtitle B, 100-th Congress, April 1986) is in effect tion. However, tobacco production is increased on a major adjustment toward market equilibrium, with the other representative farms.
continued gradual deregulation. Quantity and prices would have approached market equilibrium more Although average costs of tobacco production rapidly if the Secretary of Agriculture had used the decrease to $1.00 per pound, the increase in total cost low discretionary factor in setting the support price is larger than the increase in gross revenue. There-(65 percent of the amount estimated under the curfore, net revenue from tobacco decreases by $17 rent formula) and the high discretionary factor in million. New revenue from other enterprises setting the quota (103 percent of the components that decreases by $3.1 million. Total net revenue determine national quota). The Secretary used the decreases for all farms, except Farm X322. Farm low discretionary factor in setting the support price X 322 has sufficient resources, including technology, for flue-cured tobacco. The 1989 average price paid to expand tobacco production by a large magnitude.
for South Carolina flue-cured tobacco was $1.43 Lee et al. , is adopted to estimate the impacts of changes in tobacco prices and agriculaTotal earned income losses in parentheses. bOer agriculture includes: cotton, food and feed tural output on tobacco farms on total value added Other agriculture includes: cotton, food and feed i P Crln grains, grass seed, fruits, tree nuts, sugar crops, greenin South Carolina. house products, etc.
Impacts of deregulation on individual farms are lndustries with more than $100,000 increase in total not equal. Producers with mechanical harvesters earned income in the long run.
expand tobacco production to achieve economies of scale and thereby increase their income. Due to economies of scale, the average costs of tobacco (1984 dollars) per pound, below the model's esproduction decrease from $1.08 in the benchmark timate for the intermediate run. timate fo eiin the long run. Small producers with non-mechaniCarolina produced on 48,000 acres, equal to the in the long run. Small producers with non-mechaniacreage produced on the 1984 benchmark model. cal harvesters, unable to compete in an unregulated acreage produc n te 14 b k m l market, cease tobacco production. Loss in income to However, this is not a true indication of the effect of smallproducersisgreaterthanthegain in incometo partial deregulation or the Tobacco Improvement large producers. Act, since the program changes were made in 1986.
Interpretation of the usual surplus triangles chanTobacco acreage in South Carolina decreased to ges with market level. Impacts on total value added 37,000 acres in 1986 under the previous program.
due only to changes in tobacco output are larger than The increase in acreage from 1986 to 1989 was about the net impacts. This is because increases in tobacco 30 percent and is comparable to the model's interoutput are at the expense of other products produced mediate-run estimate of 34 percent.
on tobacco farms in South Carolina. However, net impacts of deregulation on total value added in Impacts of the tobacco program on non-farm secSouth Carolina are positive. Total value added intors of the economy are large, even though these creases by $4.1 million in the intermediate run and impacts are often unintentional. If tobacco produc-$5.8 million in the long run following deregulation. tion is deregulated, the increase in total value added As deregulation increases total value added, it is fornon-farm sectors is larger thanthe increase in the total value added for farm product sectors. reasonable to question whether the current tobacco total value added for farm product sectors program is the proper vehicle to transfer income to inear prorammin and inputoutput techn are limited by their restrictive assumptions (e.g. some segments of the community. However, the constancy in relative prices, fixed technical coeffiprimary benefit of the program is the transfer of cients, etc.). However, some of the assumptions can income to small and medium size farms with nonbe relaxed to represent other scenarios, as developed mechanical harvesters. Impacts of deregulation on in this paper. With these modifications, the analytithe financial viability of tobacco farms are not cal framework developed overcomes some of the analyzed in this study.
limitations of previous approaches.
